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Idea #20622: Make it less obvious to install untrusted packages

Written by alexandervanhoorn the 11 Jul 09 at 10:38. Related project: Add/Remove program dialog. Status: New
Rationale
When a new version of a program comes out, some users will want to install it. When looking online, many blogs and guides suggest adding some repository or installing third party packages from an unverified source. Users don't expect viruses, because there have not been any Ubuntu-targeted viruses.

But installing a third party .deb or adding an unverified repository gives the resource full control over your system, and I think many regular users don't realize that.

The whole security aspect of open source is lost when users are installing just any binary package from the internet, so we should spread awareness about untrusted software sources.
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35
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Solution #1: Tell the user about the risk
Written by alexandervanhoorn the 11 Jul 09 at 10:38.
No popup or anything, just add something like "Warning: Don't install packages from untrusted sources" in gdebi.

It's not annoying or obtrusive.

Awareness is necessary.
48
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Solution #2: Take away most of the need of third party packages
Written by alexandervanhoorn the 11 Jul 09 at 10:45.
This will not be an entire solution, but if we provide easier access to newer (unstable) versions, users are less likely to get their packages from untrusted websites.

By easier I mean easier than adding a ppa repository and adding a pgp key via synaptic.

For example: installing pidgin 2.5.8 in Jaunty should be possible from synaptic when it's available, instead of keeping people tied to 2.5.5 for half a year.
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Solution #3: Repository permissions
Written by Stebalien the 6 Aug 09 at 04:28.
Different repositories would "own" packages:
1. Ownership would be set in a file such as /etc/apt/ownership/.list
2. A special system packages file would be created that would designate system packages (sudo, pam etc...).

Apt repositories would have permissions:
0. Ultimate Trust: Update and Install packages from this repository regardless of ownership including system packages
1. All: Update and Install new packages from this repository regardless of ownership (except system owned packages).
2. Owned only: Update and install only owned packages.
3. No Updates: Install owned packages from this repository but do not download updates from it.

Flags:
1. Warning: There would be a warning flag that a user could set on a repository that would warn when packages are updated or installed from that repository.
2. System: There would be a system flag that could be set on security related packages (sudo, bash etc...) that would prevent all but "Ultimate Trust" repositories from installing/updating them.

Propose your solution

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Comments
covox wrote on the 15 Jul 09 at 04:16
In theory, verifying each deb is signed before installing is possible. In practice, if you look at your /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg you'll notice Ubuntu have turned it off as the main repositories don't use it. What little correspondence I can find about signed packages is mostly along the lines of "debsign is pretty broken, don't use it".

As for PPAs, there's already plenty of warning when you add an untrusted repository. apt, Update Manager et. al. will gladly whine every time you upgrade an untrusted package until you follow the non-trivial steps of downloading and adding the guy's public key.

(I say "non-trivial"; while some sites like WineHQ tell you to download a .GPG file and add it via System->Software Sources->Authentication, by contrast the Launchpad PPAs ask to call apt-key from the command line. Worlds of difference from a usability POV.)


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